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Abstract: 
Capability approach is an evolving subject. While Amartya Sen developed the skeleton of the 
capability approach, the colleagues of Sen and his followers expanded the approach. Martha 
Nussbaum is a colleague of Amartya Sen who tried to use capability approach as a broad 
theory of social justice. Hence, she tried to be very methodological in her understanding of 
capability approach. She argued that a comprehensive understanding of capability approach 
needs us to go beyond Sen. She added a new twist to the existing understanding of the 
subject. She prepared a list of capabilities which she thought will provide the best conditions 
for human development. She claims that her list is more practical and suitable for gender 
justice. The present paper is an attempt to probe into the issues raised by Nussbaum. Along 
with this, the paper would also try to draw attention to the similar kind of lists prepared by 
other contemporary writers. In the concluding part it would focus on why it is a anomaly to 
prepare a list of capabilities in a diverse society like India.  
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While Amartya Sen introduced the 
capability approach in the 1980s, other 
scholars have developed it further in recent 
years. The most well known is the work of 
Martha Nussbaum. Sen’s and Nussbaum’s 
approaches are very closely related, and 
are allies in their critique of theories such 
as utilitarianism. However, Nussbaum and 
Sen also differ on a number of issues. 
(Gasper, 2004) Nussbaum and Sen have 
different goals with their work on 
capabilities. They also have different 
personal intellectual histories in which 
their work needs to be situated. Nussbaum 
aims to develop a partial theory of justice, 
by arguing for the political principles that 
should underlie each constitution. Thus, 
Nussbaum enters the capability approach 
from a perspective of moral-legal Political 
philosophy, with the specific aim of 
arguing for political principles that a 
government should guarantee to all its 
citizens through its constitution. To 
perform this task, Nussbaum develops and 
argues for a well-defined but general list of 
‘central human capabilities’ that should be 
incorporated in all constitutions. As such, 
her work on the capability approach is 
universalistic, as she argues all 
governments should endorse these 
capabilities. Sen did not have such a clear 
objective when he started to work on the 
capability approach. On the one hand, he 
was interested in the “equality of what?’ 
question in liberal political philosophy, 
and argued that there are good reasons to 
focus on capabilities instead of Rawlsian 
resources or utility. (Sen, 1979) 
First, whereas in Sen’s work the 
notion of capabilities is primarily that of a 
real or effective opportunity (as in social 
choice theory), Nussbaum’s notion of 
capability pays more attention to people’s 
skills and personality traits as aspects of 
capabilities. Some scholars therefore 
favour Nussbaum’s approach over Sen’s. 
For example, Des Gasper argues that 
Nussbaum’s approach has more potential 
to understand actions, meanings and 
motivations. But because Sen’s approach 
lies closer to economic theory, many 
economists find his approach more 
attractive, and the UNDP’s (1990- 2004) 
Human Developed Reports have also been 
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built on Sen’s version. Second, Nussbaum 
develops three categories of capability 
which are different from Sen’s. Basic 
capabilities are innate abilities (and thus, 
as discussed earlier, used in a very 
different meaning from Sen’s use). 
Internal capabilities are states of a person 
that enable her to exercise a specific 
capability, ifthe circumstances and 
constraints allow this exercise. Combined 
capabilities are the internal capabilities 
together with the external provisions that 
effectively enable the person to exercise 
the capability (Nussbaum, 1988). But 
while their categories and terminology 
somewhat differ, both Sen and Nussbaum 
hold that politics should focus on 
combined capabilities. Third, Nussbaum 
proposes a concrete list of capabilities, 
which is composed of the following ten 
categories: 1. Life; 2. Bodily health; 3. 
Bodily integrity; 4. Senses, imagination 
and thought; 5. Emotions; 6. Practical 
reason; 7. Affiliation;8. Other species; 9. 
Play;10. Control over one’s environment. 
Nussbaum has specified this list in more 
detail in several of her recent publications 
(Nussbaum 2000; 2003a). The list is 
always open for revision, hence one needs 
to look at the most recent version of her 
list. In addition, Nussbaum argues that if 
Sen’s capability approach wants to have 
any bite with respect to justice, he too will 
have to endorse such a list. However, Sen 
has always refused to endorse one specific 
well-defined list of capabilities, for reasons 
that will be discussed in the next section. 
Fourth, Nussbaum explains her work on 
capabilities as providing citizens with a 
justification and arguments for 
constitutional principles that citizens have 
a right to demand from their 
government.(Nussbaum, 1988)  Sen’s 
capability approach, in contrast, need not 
be so focused on claims on the 
government, due to its wider scope. 
Indeed, one can discuss inequality in 
capabilities without necessarily knowing 
how these inequalities can be rectified, or 
without assuming that all redistribution, 
rectification or social change have to be 
done by the government. Nussbaum has 
been criticized for her belief in a 
benevolent government, especially from 
authors who are more situated in the 
traditions of post-structuralism, post-
colonialism, postmodernism and critical 
theory.(Menon, 2002) In liberal Anglo-
American political philosophy, it is 
common to discuss issues of social and 
distributive justice in terms of what the 
government’s responsibilities are to do 
justice, but in other paradigms there is no 
such a focus, or perhaps even a belief, in 
the actions of government. Fifth and 
finally, Nussbaum does not endorse the 
agency-well-being distinction that Sen 
advocates. Nussbaum argues that “all the 
important distinctions can be captured as 
aspects of the capability/functioning 
distinction”. (Nussbaum, 2000)  Some 
critics suggest that her theory doesn’t 
sufficiently allow for agency in its diverse 
manifestations.  However, Nussbaum has 
argued that practical reason has an 
architectonic role in her approach – it has a 
role that goes beyond its direct 
contribution to well-being. Thus, the 
exercise of practical reason is probably a 
main site of agency in Nussbaum’s 
approach, but it remains to be further 
explored how the concepts of agency differ 
in Sen’s and Nussbaum’s work. 
BROAD CONTEXT 
Nussbaum argues “certain 
universal norms of human capability 
should be central for political purposes in 
thinking about basic political principles 
that can provide the underpinning for a set 
of constitutional guarantees in all nations.” 
(Nussbaum, 2000)  These norms are used 
for comparison across nations. Capability 
approach begins with the question of what 
actually the person is able to do and able to 
be? Suppose we are taking a stand for 
political purposes on working a list of 
functions that would appear to be of 
central importance in human life. We may 
ask is the person capable of this or not? 
We not only ask about the person’s 
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satisfaction with what she does, but also 
whether she is in a position to do (what her 
opportunities and liberties are). We also 
enquire not only about the available 
resources, but also how these resources 
enable the person to function in a fully 
human way. (Nussbaum, 2000) 
When it comes to comparison, it is 
in terms of these capabilities to function in 
certain core areas that we would measure 
that person’s quality of life. Then only we 
will be able to compare her quality of life 
to that of others. Second, the political 
arrangement would find it easy to ensure 
justice when we have a list of areas where 
to stress. On Nussbaum’s words “If People 
are systematically falling below the 
threshold in one of these core areas this 
should be seen as a situation both unjust 
and tragic in need of urgent attention or 
even if in other respects things are going 
well.” (Nussbaum, 2000) 
Nussbaum provides two reasons 
for this arrangement. First, there are 
certain functions which are central in 
human life and their presence defines the 
standard of living. Second, to function in a 
humane way and not just to behave like 
animals. Marx explains this point by 
saying that a starving person does not use 
food in a fully human way rather he/she 
grabs the food for survival. The question 
of human dignity has cross cultural appeal. 
At one extreme we may judge that the 
absence of capability for a central function 
is so acute that the person is not really a 
human being at all, or any longer. But the 
important point to be stressed is not that 
boundary rather a threshold, a level at 
which a person become truly human. 
Nussbaum like Sen wants to treat each 
person a bearer of value as an end. Each 
person is treated as worthy of regard in 
which each has been put in a position to 
live really humanly. That is where the idea 
of threshold comes in. A person is to be 
treated as an end; capability is to be sought 
on an individual basis and not on the 
basics of family, or corporate bodies. No 
doubt these institutions are important in 
promotion of human capabilities. Yet the 
ultimate goal is always the promotion of 
the capability of each person. Before we 
proceed further, we have to understand the 
fact that capability carries different 
meaning for Sen and Nussbaum. For 
Amartya Sen, capability reflects a person’s 
freedom to achieve valuable functionings. 
Nussbaum argues that capabilities are 
potential functionings. That is why she 
wants to enlist those capabilities.  
NUSSBAUM’S VERSION OF 
CAPABILITY APPROACH  
The basic idea of her version of 
capability approach has been explained in 
the book Women and Human 
Development: The capability approach. 
She begins with a conception of human 
life with full of dignity. To pursue this life 
of dignity she attempts to justify a list of 
ten capabilities as central requirements of a 
life with dignity. These ten capabilities are 
supposed to be general goals that can be 
further specified by the society in question, 
as it works on the account of fundamental 
entitlements it wishes to endorse. 
Moreover, the capabilities are held to be 
important for each and every person; each 
person is treated as an end and none as a 
mere adjunct or means to the ends of 
others. And although in practical terms 
priorities may have to be set temporarily, 
the capabilities are understood as both 
mutually supportive and all of central 
relevance to social justice.” (Nussbaum, 
2006)  Nussbaum calls the list of 
capabilities as Central Human Capabilities. 
The Central Human Capabilities are:  
 Life: Being able to live to the end 
of a human life of normal length, 
not dying prematurely, or before 
one’s life is so reduced as to be not 
worth living.  
 Bodily Health: Being able to have 
good health, including reproductive 
health, to be adequately nourished, 
to have adequate shelter. 
 Bodily Integrity: Being able to 
move freely from place to place to 
be secure against violent assault, 
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including sexual assault and 
domestic violence, having 
opportunities for sexual satisfaction 
and for choice in matters of 
reproduction.  
 Senses, Imagination and Thought: 
Being able to use the sense, to 
imagine, think and reason and to do 
these things in a truly human way, 
a way informed and cultivated by 
an adequate education, including 
by no means limited to, literacy 
and basic mathematical and 
scientific training. Being able to 
use imagination and thought in 
connection with experiencing and 
producing works and events of 
one’s own choice, religious, 
literacy, musical and so forth. 
Being able to use one’s mind in 
ways protected by guarantees of 
freedom of expression with respect 
to both political and artistic speech, 
and freedom of religious exercise. 
Being able to have pleasurable 
experiences and to avoid non 
beneficial pain.  
 Emotions: Being able to have 
attachments to things and people 
outside ourselves, to love those 
who love and care for us, to grieve 
at their absence, in general, to love 
those who love and care for us etc.  
 Practical Reason: Being able to 
form a conception of the good and 
to engage in critical reflection 
about the planning of one’s life. 
 Affiliation: Being able to live with 
and toward others, to recognize and 
show concern for other human 
beings, to engage in various forms 
of social interaction, to be able to 
imagine the situation of another. 
(Protecting this capability means 
protecting institutions that 
constitute and nourish such forms 
of affiliation, and also protecting 
the freedom of assembly and 
political speech. Having the social 
bases of self respect and non 
humiliation, being able to be 
treated as a dignified being whose 
worth is equal to that of others. 
This entails provisions of 
nondiscrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, sexual orientation, 
ethnicity, caste, religion and 
national origin. 
 Other Species: Being able to live 
with concern for and in relation to 
animals, plants and the world of 
nature 
 Play: Being able to laugh, to play, 
to enjoy recreational activities 
 Control over one’s Environment  
 Political: Being able to 
participate effectively in 
political choices that govern 
one’s life, having the right of 
political participation, 
protections of free speech and 
association. 
 Material: Being able to hold 
property (both land and 
movable goods), and having 
property rights on an equal 
basis with others, having the 
right to seek employment on 
an equal basis with others, 
having the freedom from 
unwarranted search and 
seizure. In work, being able 
to work as a human being, 
exercising practical reason, 
and entering into meaningful 
relationship of mutual 
recognition with other 
workers.  
There are two important 
qualifications on this list. First, they are a 
list of separate components. They are 
distinct in quality and all are of central 
importance. Second, they are related to one 
another in complex ways that can only be 
discovered empirically. Nussbaum also 
tries to distinguish between different 
capabilities. Basic capabilities are the 
innate equipment of individuals that is the 
necessary basis for developing more 
advanced capabilities. She points out that 
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most infants have the basic capabilities for 
practical reason and imagination, though 
without a good deal more development and 
education they cannot use it. Healthy 
children have basic capabilities in all ten 
of the areas in the above list. Internal 
capabilities are states of persons that are . . 
. sufficient conditions for the exercise of 
the corresponding function (given suitable 
complement of external conditions). 
Internal capabilities build on pre-existing 
basic capabilities by processes such as 
exercise, education, and training. Most 
adults have the internal capabilities of use 
of speech, capabilities that would not exist 
without the informal education that occurs 
along with socialization. Many internal 
capabilities require a more structured 
educational environment. Combined 
capabilities are defined as internal 
capabilities plus the external conditions 
that make the exercise of a function a live 
option. The aim of public policy is the 
promotion of combined capabilities; this 
requires two kinds of efforts (1) the 
promotion of internal capabilities (say, by 
education or training) and (2) the making 
available of the external institutional and 
material conditions.  
After preparing a list of central 
human capabilities, she argues that the list 
is sensitive to cultural differences because 
of several reasons. First, she considers the 
list to be open-ended and subject to 
ongoing revision and rethinking, in the 
way that any society’s account of its most 
fundamental entitlements is always subject 
to supplementation. Second, the items on 
the list ought to be specified in a 
somewhat abstract and general way. This 
is done precisely in order to leave room for 
the activities of specifying and deliberating 
by citizens and their legislatures and courts 
that all democratic nations contain. Within 
certain parameters, it is perfectly 
appropriate that different nations should do 
this somewhat differently, taking their 
histories and special circumstances into 
account. Thus, for example, a free speech 
right that suits Germany well might be too 
restrictive in the different climate of the 
United States. Third, the list is introduced 
for political purposes only and without any 
grounding in metaphysical ideas of the sort 
that divide people along lines of culture 
and religion. Fourth, if the appropriate 
political target is capability and not 
functioning, then again the defense of 
pluralism comes here. Many people who 
are willing to support a given capability as 
a fundamental entitlement would feel 
violated if functioning is made basic. 
Thus, the right to vote can be endorsed by 
believing citizens who would feel deeply 
violated by mandatory voting, because it 
goes against their religious conception. 
They believe that it is wrong to participate 
in political life, but they endorse the right 
of citizens to vote. The free expression of 
religion can be endorsed by people who 
would totally object to any establishment 
of religion that would involve dragooning 
all citizens into some type of religious 
functioning. Fifth, the major liberties that 
protect pluralism are central items on the 
list: the freedom of speech, the freedom of 
association, the freedom of conscience. By 
placing them on the list she gives them a 
central and non-negotiable place.  The 
items on the list ought to be specified in a 
somewhat abstract and general way, in 
order to leave room for the activities of 
specifying and deliberating by citizens and 
their legislatures and courts that all 
democratic nations contain. (This has been 
challenged in the last part of this chapter). 
Nussbaum argues that major liberties that 
protect pluralism are central items on the 
list: the freedom of speech, the freedom of 
association, the freedom of conscience. By 
placing them on the list we give them a 
central and nonnegotiable place. 
(Nussbaum, 2000) 
Nussbaum argues that Sen is 
absolutely silent on these issues. There is a 
tension in Sen’s writings. On the one hand, 
he speaks as if certain specific capabilities 
are absolutely central and nonnegotiable. 
Nussbaum argues that Sen’s discussions of 
health, education, political and civil 
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liberties, and the free choice of occupation 
are important but the readers have a 
feeling of that these human capabilities 
should enjoy a strong priority and should 
be made central by states the world over, 
as fundamental entitlements of each and 
every citizen. In the case of liberty, Sen 
actually endorses giving liberty a 
considerable priority, though without 
giving an exhaustive enumeration of the 
liberties that would fall under this 
principle. His role in the formulation of the 
measures that go into the Human 
Development Reports, moreover, clearly 
shows that he is endorsing a group of 
health and education related capabilities as 
the appropriate way to measure quality of 
life across nations. 
One the one hand, Sen has 
conspicuously refused to endorse any 
account of the central capabilities. Thus, 
the examples mentioned by Nussbaum 
remain insignificant. They are examples of 
something he thinks very important, but it 
is not clear to what extent he is prepared to 
recommend them as important goals for 
the entire world’s people, goals connected 
with the idea of social justice itself. And it 
is equally unclear whether there are other 
capabilities not mentioned so frequently 
that might be equally important, and if so, 
what those capabilities might be. The 
reason for this appears to be his respect for 
democratic deliberation. He feels that 
people should be allowed to settle these 
matters for themselves.  
Nussbaum claims that the 
arguments presented in Development as 
Freedom are more problematic.(Agarwal, 
2004)  Sen uses the language of 
perspective of freedom and continues to 
use it again and again, suggesting that 
freedom is a general all purpose social 
good, and that capabilities are to be seen as 
instances of this general good of human 
freedom. Such a view is not incompatible 
with ranking some freedoms ahead of 
others for political purposes. But it does 
seem to go in a problematic direction. First 
of all, it is unclear whether the idea of 
promoting freedom is even a coherent 
political project. Some freedoms limit 
others. The freedom of rich people to make 
large donations to political campaigns 
limits the equal worth of the right to vote. 
The freedom of businesses to pollute the 
environment limits the freedom of citizens 
to enjoy an unpolluted environment. The 
freedom of landowners to keep their land 
limits projects of land reform that might be 
argued to be central to many freedoms for 
the poor. Obviously, these freedoms are 
not among those that Sen considers, but he 
says nothing to limit the account of 
freedom or to rule out conflicts of this 
type. (Agarwal, 2004) The conflicting role 
of human freedom has significant bearing 
for Indian society which is hierarchical. 
(Nussbaum, 2000) In a society marked by 
features of hierarchy, freedom looses its 
significance because it produces more 
conflict. Freedom can be more valuable 
and productive when the social set up is 
liberal and democratic. In India, while the 
political system is liberal democratic, the 
social system is authoritarian. 
Furthermore, even if there were a 
coherent project that viewed all freedoms 
as desirable social goals, it is not at all 
clear that this is the sort of project 
someone with Sen’s political and critical 
views ought to endorse. The examples that 
Nussbaum has just given show us that any 
political project that is going to protect the 
equal worth of certain basic liberties for 
the poor, and to improve their living 
conditions, needs to say forthrightly that 
some freedoms are central for political 
purposes, and some are distinctly not. 
Some freedoms involve basic social 
entitlements, and others do not. Some lie at 
the heart of a view of political justice, and 
others do not. Among the ones that do not 
lie at the core, some are simply less 
important, but others may be positively 
bad.  
For example, the freedom of rich 
people to make large campaign 
contributions, which is defended by many 
Americans in the name of the general good 
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of freedom. This is not an ideal condition 
of freedom, that lie at the heart of a set of 
basic entitlements to which a just society 
should commit itself. Similarly, the 
freedom of industry to pollute the 
environment is again not among those 
freedoms that should enjoy protection, 
beyond a certain point. Suppose, I am a 
wholesale businessmen who sell cereals 
and pulses in the market. Suddenly, there 
is a crisis in its production. Immediately, I 
decide to double the prices of the products. 
This type of freedom cannot be defended. 
Nussbaum argues that the idea of 
gender justice cannot be successfully 
pursued without limiting male freedom. 
For example, the right to have intercourse 
with one’s wife whether she gives consent 
or not, has been understood as a time-
honored male prerogative in most 
societies, and men have greatly resented 
the curtailment of liberty that followed 
from laws against marital rape. Still many 
societies do not acknowledge it. The 
freedom to harass women in the workplace 
is tenaciously guarded prerogative of 
males the world over, the minute sexual 
harassment regulations are introduced, one 
always hears protests invoking the idea of 
liberty.  
In short, no society that pursues 
equality or even an ample social minimum 
can avoid curtailing freedom in very many 
ways, and what it ought to say is, those 
freedoms are not good, they are not part of 
a core group of entitlements required by 
the notion of social justice, and in many 
ways indeed, they subvert those core 
entitlements. Of other freedoms, for 
example, the freedom of motorcyclist to 
drive without helmets, a society can say, 
these freedoms are not important, they are 
neither very bad nor very good. They are 
not implicit in our conception of social 
justice, but they do not subvert it either.    
In other words, all societies that 
pursue a reasonably just political 
conception have to evaluate human 
freedoms, saying that some are central and 
some trivial, some good and some actively 
bad. This evaluation also affects the way 
we will assess an abridgement of a 
freedom. Certain freedoms are taken to be 
entitlements of citizens based upon justice. 
When any one of these is abridged, that is 
an especially grave failure of the political 
system. In such cases, people feel that 
abridgement is not just a cost to be borne; 
it is a cost of a distinctive kind, involving a 
violation of basic justice. When some 
freedom outside the core is abridged, that 
may be a small cost or a large cost to some 
actor or actors, but it is not accost of 
exactly that same kind, one that is 
independent of the cost, at least in terms of 
standard subjective willingness-to-pay 
models. Thus, motorcyclists may mind 
greatly a law that tells them to wear a 
helmet. In terms of standard willingness to 
pay models, they might be willing to pay 
quite a lot for the right to drive without a 
helmet. On the other hand, many citizens 
probably would not think that not being 
able to vote was a big cost. In terms of 
standard willingness to pay models, at 
least, they would not pay much for the 
right to vote, and some might have to be 
paid for voting.  
Sen’s response to these questions 
has been to say that freedom per se is 
always good, although it can be badly 
used. (Sen, 1995)  Freedom, he said, is like 
male strength: male strength is per se a 
good thing, although it can be used to beat 
up women. This argument of Sen does not 
convince Nussbaum. For so much depends 
on how one specifies the freedoms in 
question. Some freedoms include injustice 
in their very definition. Thus, the freedom 
to rape one’s wife without penalty, the 
freedom to hand out sign saying No blacks 
here, the freedom of an employer to 
discriminate on grounds of race or sex or 
religion-those are freedoms all right, and 
some people jealously defend them. But it 
seems absurd to say that they are good per 
se, and bad only in use. Any society that 
allows people these freedoms has allowed 
a fundamental injustice, involving the 
subordination of a vulnerable group. Of 
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other freedoms, for example, the freedom 
of the motorcycle rider to ride without a 
helmet, we should not say, good in itself, 
bad only in use, we should say neutral and 
trivial in it, probably bad in use. Once 
again, attention to the all important issue 
of content is vital.  
Nussbaum argues that Sen cannot 
avoid committing himself to a core list of 
fundamental capabilities, once he faces 
such questions. (Agarwal, 2004) If 
capabilities are to be used in advancing a 
conception of social justice, they will 
obviously have to be specified. Either, a 
society has a conception of basic justice or 
it does not. If it has one, we have to know 
what its content is, and what opportunities 
and liberties it takes to be fundamental 
entitlements of all citizens. One cannot 
have a conception of social justice that 
says, simply, ‘All citizens are entitled to 
freedom understood as capability’. (Sen, 
1995) Besides, being wrong and 
misleading, such a blanket endorsement of 
freedom/capability as goal would be 
hopelessly vague. It would be impossible 
to say whether the society in question was 
just or unjust. 
There is a possibility that some 
might defend the case of preparing the list 
of capabilities but would insist that it 
should be left open to societies themselves 
to prepare it through public deliberation. 
The answer to this question, however, is 
given in all of Sen’s work, some human 
matters are too important to be left to 
whim and caprice, or even to the dictates 
of a cultural tradition. To say that 
education for women, or adequate 
healthcare, is not justified just in case 
some societies believe that it is not 
justified seems like a capitulation to 
subjective preferences, of the sort that Sen 
has opposed throughout his career.  
In short, it makes sense to take the 
issue of social justice seriously, and to use 
a norm of justice to assess the various 
nations of the world and their practices. 
But if the issue of social justice is 
important, then the content of a conception 
of justice is important. Social justice has 
always been a profoundly normative 
concept, and its role is typically critical, 
we work out an account of what is just, 
and we then use it to find deficiency in 
various ways. Sen’s whole career has been 
devoted to developing norms of justice in 
exactly this way, and holding them up 
against reality to produce valuable 
criticisms. Nussbaum argues that Sen’s 
commitment to normative thinking about 
justice requires the endorsement of some 
definite content. 
Such leaving up for grabs is all the 
more dangerous when we are confronting 
women’s issues. For obviously enough, 
many traditional conceptions of social 
justice and fundamental entitlements have 
made women second-class citizens, if 
citizens at all. Women’s liberties, 
opportunities, property rights, and political 
rights have been construed as unequal to 
men and this has been taken to be a just 
state of affairs. Nor have traditional 
accounts of justice attended at all to issues 
that are particularly urgent for women, 
such as issues of bodily integrity, sexual 
harassment, the issue of public support for 
care to children, the disabled, and the 
elderly.  
Nussbaum presents two points that 
pertain specifically to the norm of respect 
for pluralism which I have challenged in 
the last part of this chapter. First, the value 
of respect for pluralism itself requires a 
commitment to some cross-cultural 
principles as fundamental entitlements. 
Real respect for pluralism means strong 
and unwavering protection for religious 
freedom, for the protection for religious 
freedom, for the freedom of association, 
for the freedom of speech. If we say that 
we are for pluralism, and yet refuse to 
commit ourselves to the nonnegotiablity of 
these items as fundamental building blocks 
of a just political order, we show that we 
are really half hearted about pluralism. 
Nussbaum believes that Sen would agree 
with this proposition.  She expects that Sen 
would say the same about other items on 
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the list such as health and education, if a 
nation says that they are for human 
capabilities, but refuses to give these 
special protection for all citizens, citing 
reasons of cultural or religious pluralism, 
Sen will surely say that they are not 
making a good argument, or giving 
genuine protection to pluralism. Instead, 
they are very often, denying people the 
chance to figure out what culture and form 
of life they actually want. So they are 
actually curtailing the most meaningful 
kind of pluralism, which requires having a 
life of one’s own and some choices 
regarding it. And that goal surely requires 
a certain level of basic health and 
education.  
The second argument is one that 
derives from the Rawlsian idea of political 
liberalism. The argument says that 
classical liberalism erred by endorsing 
freedom or autonomy as a general good in 
human life. Both earlier liberals such as 
John Stuart Mill and modern 
comprehensive liberals such as Joseph Raz 
hold that autonomy and freedom of choice 
are essential freedom across the board. 
Rawls and Nussbaum hold that this 
general endorsement of freedom shows 
deficient respect for citizens whose 
comprehensive conceptions of the good 
human life do not make freedom and 
autonomy central human values. People 
who belong to an authoritarian religion 
cannot agree with Raz or Mill that 
autonomy is a generally good thing. 
Presumably, the Milean state would 
denigrate them too, and would design 
education and other institutions to disfavor 
them, although their civil liberties would 
not be restricted. Rawls and Nussbaum 
would agree that this strategy shows 
deficient respect for a reasonable pluralism 
of different comprehensive conceptions of 
the good life. We should respect people 
who prefer a life within an authoritarian 
religion so long as certain basic 
opportunities and exit options are firmly 
guaranteed.  
 Nussbaum holds that this respect 
for pluralism is fostered both by making 
capability and not functioning the 
appropriate political goal and also by 
endorsing a relatively small list of core 
capabilities for political purposes. Two 
things are important in this context. First, 
that endorsing the capabilities list does not 
require them to endorse the associated 
functioning as a good in their own lives. 
Second, since it is a very short list shows 
that we are leaving them lots of room to 
value other things in mapping out their 
plan of life. We do not ask them to endorse 
freedom as a general good-as we might 
seem to do if we talk a lot about freedom 
but fail to make a list. Instead, we just ask 
them to endorse this short list of freedoms 
for political purposes and as applicable to 
all citizens. They may then get on with the 
lives they prefer.  
Criteria for Selecting the Capabilities 
The fact that the capability 
approach is not a fully fleshed out theory 
means that its further specifications can be 
diverse. For each such specification, 
Nussbaum proposes a list of capabilities. 
How should this selection be made, and 
what type of list is appropriate when 
drawing up a list of capabilities? 
Nussbaum has suggested that the 
following five criteria should be employed 
to select the list of capabilities.  
The Criteria of Explicit 
Formulation: The most basic criterion is 
that the list should be explicit, discussed, 
and defended. To political and moral 
philosophers this might seem an obvious 
requirement as can be seen from Martha 
Nussbaum’s very careful and elaborate 
defense of her list. Here, Nussbaum 
actually speaks about public deliberations. 
Being a liberal philosopher, she 
understands the value of public 
deliberations. Deliberations sometimes 
produce excellent results. It produces a list 
with wider acceptability. 
The Criterion of Methodological 
Justification: When drawing up a list, we 
should clarify and scrutinize the method 
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that has generated the list and justify this 
as appropriate for the issue at hand. 
Methods are very important as they 
explain the procedures of selection. 
The Criterion of Sensitivity to 
Context: The level of abstraction at which 
the list is pitched should be appropriate for 
fulfilling the objectives for which we are 
seeking to use the capability approach. 
This criterion thus proposes a pragmatic 
approach towards drawing up a list by 
acknowledging that it is important to speak 
the language of the debate in which we 
want to get involved. For example, in 
philosophical discussions the list will be 
specified at a highly abstract level, 
whereas for political, social or economic 
discussions the list will be less abstract. 
And even within the latter discussions, the 
level of abstraction can vary: the context 
of legal rights will require a list at a higher 
level of abstraction when one measures 
socio-economic inequality.  
The Criterion of different Levels of 
Generality: The fourth criterion is related 
to, but distinct, form the third. It states that 
if the specification aim at an empirical 
application, or wants to lead to 
implementation policy proposals, then the 
list should be drawn up in at least two 
stages. The first stage can involve drawing 
up a kind of ideal list, unconstrained by 
limitations of data or measurement design, 
or of socio-economic or political 
feasibility. The second stage would be 
drawing up a more pragmatic list which 
takes such constraints into account. 
Distinguishing between the ideal and the 
second best is important, because 
constraints might change over time, for 
example as knowledge expands, empirical 
research methods become more refined, or 
the reality of political or economic 
feasibility changes. Care labour is a case in 
point in the context of gender inequality. 
Few, if any, empirical data sets have 
information on capabilities related to care 
labour, however listing these capabilities 
in an ideal list strengthens the case for 
collecting data on care, which will then 
alter the analysis and perhaps the policies. 
Gender biases in the social sciences partly 
explain why many data sets contain so 
little information on who provides caring 
labour, and where, when how much, why 
and under what circumstances. Without 
this multi-stage procedure, the list could 
automatically reproduce the existing 
biases. The use of this procedure could 
help reduce such biases stemming from the 
social situatedness of researchers and 
policy makers.  
The Criterion of Exhaustion and 
Non-reduction: The last criterion is that the 
listed capabilities should include all 
important elements. Moreover, the 
elements included should not be reducible 
to other elements. There may be some 
overlap, provided it is not substantial. This 
does not exclude the possibility that a 
subset might have such an important status 
that it requires being considered on its 
own, independent of the larger set. 
To sum up, the selection of 
capabilities requires careful attention, as 
there is a potential danger of strengthening 
existing and eccentric and other biases.  
LIST OF CAPABILITIES: SOME 
QUESTIONS 
While the idea of defending a 
particular list of capabilities seems to be 
very attractive yet it raises several 
questions. Martha Nussbaum has argued 
that Sen should endorse one definite list of 
valuable capabilities if he wants to apply 
the capability approach to social justice 
and gender inequality. Nussbaum has 
herself drawn up such a list of capabilities 
that she defends as universally valid. It is 
crucial to note that Nussbaum and Sen’s 
version of the capability approach have 
different theoretical assertions and their 
approaches entail different conceptions of 
what the list should be doing. As Sabina 
Alkire notes: ‘Nussbaum’s list is ‘A list of 
normative things to do’, it has a highly 
prescriptive character and she makes 
strong universalistic claims regarding its 
scope.(Alkire, 2002) Nussbaum has also 
used the capability approach to develop a 
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universal theory of the good: it applies to 
all social justice issues and to the world as 
a whole. This does not imply, she argues 
that her list is insensitive to culture and 
context. It is formulated at a highly 
abstract level, and for each country or 
community it can then be made more 
specific. Hence, in Nussbaum’s theory, 
there is one universal general list that can 
be translated into more detailed and 
specific lists to suit the context.”(Alkire, 
2002) In her approach to enlisting of 
capabilities, she tries to emulate John 
Rawls’ political liberalism. (Nussbaum,  
2000) Nussbaum provides her neo-
Aristotelian account of universal values ‘as 
a basic political principle that should 
underwrite constitutional guarantees’ 
(Nussbaum, 2000). Nussbaum describes 
the outcome of her enquiry as a set of 
central human capabilities which can be 
endorsed for political purposes, as the 
basis of central constitutional guarantees, 
by people who otherwise poses as the 
moral basis of central constitutional 
guarantees, by people who otherwise have 
very different views of what a complete 
good life for a human being would be. 
(Nussbaum , 2000) 
Sen’s capability approach, by 
contrast, makes broader and less 
specified claims. Given the intrinsic 
under specification of Sen’s capability 
approach, there cannot be one catch-all 
list. Instead, each application of the 
capability approach will require its own 
list. For Sen, a list of capabilities must be 
context dependent where the context is 
both the geographical area to which it 
applies and the sort of evaluation that is 
to be done (Sen, 1995). Applications of 
Sen’s capability approach can be very 
diverse. They can be academic, activist or 
policy oriented. They can be abstract and 
philosophical or applied and down to 
earth. They can be theoretical or 
empirical. They can concern social, 
political, economic, legal, psychological 
or other dimensions of advantage taken 
together or individually or in any 
combination. They can be specified for 
the global or the local context. Nussbaum 
also argues the same thing. But in spite 
her claims of being sensitive to the local 
context, the list is subject to lot of 
criticisms and in fact the entire process 
would never be a viable one in Indian 
context. This is central focus of my 
argument in this chapter.  
It is important to note how a 
particular list could prove to be dangerous 
in Sen’s capability approach. The process 
that generates a list is important and this 
could affect a list’s political or academic 
legitimacy. Amartya Sen has repeatedly 
emphasized that in matters of social choice 
and distributive justice, processes matter a 
great deal. Indeed, we should be concerned 
not only with culmination outcomes (the 
outcome narrowly defined, here the items 
on the list) but also with the 
comprehensive outcome, which includes 
aspects of the choice process, including the 
identity of the chooser. Suppose a social 
scientist applies the capability approach to 
gender inequality assessment or a village 
council uses the capability approach to 
decide on priorities for the allocation of its 
funds then they end up using Nussbaum’s 
list of capabilities. In terms of the 
comprehensive outcome, it would still be 
important that the social scientist or the 
village could go through a democratic 
process for drawing up a list of priorities. 
This will give legitimacy to the entire 
process. Copying Nussbaum’s list will not 
generate that kind of legitimacy. In her 
book Women and Human Development, 
The Capability approach, Nussbaum has 
repeatedly argued that even her list also 
will be generated through political 
deliberation and is subject to constant 
revision. But is this a practical one? Take 
the case of India where each village has 
specific requirements. In western societies 
the demands in a particular locality are 
identical. But in India, even in a 
panchayat, which is considered to be 
lowest unit of democratic governance, 
there are variations in demands. So 
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Nussbaum would really be surprised to 
apply her methodology in India. Because 
she will exhaust herself preparing a list for 
each village. I am sure that was not her 
intention. And moreover she elaborately 
discusses the values of universalism in her 
writings (Nussbaum, 2000). She claims 
that pluralism and religious toleration are 
some of the universal values which need to 
be respected across humanity. But in the 
pretext of defending some of the cherished 
values of humanity, she has ended up in 
defending the values of universalism. In 
other words, even if the application of 
Sen’s capability approach leads us to a list 
identical to Nussbaum’s, the process by 
which Nussbaum’s list is generated might 
lack the political legitimacy needed for 
policy design. Similarly, when the 
capability approach is applied to particular 
research questions concerning gender 
inequality, all might prefer lists that are 
derived from, embedded in and engage 
with the existing literature in that field. In 
that sense, Nussbaum’s list even when 
proposing the same dimensions might lack 
academic legitimacy (Alkire, 2002). 
Second, Nussbaum argues that there are 
political obligations to protect each of 
these capabilities. Nussbaum develops 
Aristotle’s approach in two stages (Sen, 
1993). The first is to notice the different 
incommensurable ‘spheres in which 
humans must make choices and act 
somehow ‘if not properly, then 
improperly’. (Sen, 1993) She refers to this 
stage as the initial demarcation of the 
sphere of choice-for instance, the ten 
general categories of functionings. 
(Nussbaum, 2000) 
 At the second stage, one requires 
into what the appropriate choice, in that 
sphere, is –in other words, what choices in 
that sphere bring one across the threshold 
of a truly human life. (Nussbaum, 2000) 
“People will, of course, disagree about 
what the appropriate ways of acting are” 
(Nussbaum, 2000). This is because 
humans and cultures are ‘advancing 
competing specifications of the same 
virtue’. (Nussbaum, 2000) 
 Still, Nussbaum saw and continues 
to see one role of development ethics to be 
that of evaluating specifications and 
selecting the optimal ones for an 
international consensus. Furthermore, 
Nussbaum argues that the central human 
capabilities, thus specified are legitimately 
used in making comparisons across 
nations, asking how well they are doing 
relative to one another in promoting 
human quality of life. (Nussbaum, 2000) 
A critical weakness in Nussbaum’s 
approach is that it cannot fulfill both the 
respect for pluralism and the other 
characteristics at the same time and it does 
not give a procedural account of how these 
processes of local specification and cross-
national comparison are to unfold over 
time. To take just one example, at one 
point in time how can the list be both 
deeply flexible and useful for cross-
national comparisons. Directly comparable 
aspects of the list such as protection 
against discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, religion, caste, ethnicity or national 
origin leave little room for pluralism. 
Deeply flexible aspects of the list for 
example, expressions of senses, 
imagination and thought are notoriously 
difficult to compare meaningfully between 
countries.  
The importance of the specification 
process heightens, when one tries to 
imagine how Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach is applied to micro economic 
investments. For example, a woman who 
loves cooking and caring for her family 
would be told to protect the values of 
freedom of assembly and speech. These 
are some values which are of no use to her. 
Microeconomic activities of this kind will 
be temporal, limited in their pursuit of 
those capabilities to very particular aspects 
of them. In order for these investments to 
have as their objective capability 
expansion rather than economic growth, it 
seems a process would be needed to 
identify the contingently vital, valuable 
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and possible ways to expand capabilities in 
one context. But this process is very 
unclear.  
The specificity of Nussbaum’s 
project considerably restricts the domain 
of flexibility which is available to give 
priority to the particular. It is also difficult 
to reconcile with a dynamic understanding 
of community and value. If needed the 
local and particular are to be given 
ongoing priority, then the capability 
approach would seem to require a sketch 
of the process by which the national 
normative conception of the human is to 
be developed in local forms, rather than a 
sketch of the normative human conception 
such as she gives. If there were a 
procedural account, then what might be 
most useful as a companion to it would not 
be a fully normative account of the human 
being but rather a set of dimensions of 
human being that could usefully spark 
conversation. 
Third, Nussbaum does not actively 
identify who is to develop a set of 
capabilities for national use but it is clear 
that some people are expected to do so. 
Throughout the book Women and Human 
Development, the pronoun ‘we’ is 
employed without explanation. Sometimes 
the ‘we’ seems to be the unspecified 
community that is developing the 
capability approach; sometimes it seems to 
be intellectual or legal or political elite 
who are currently in authoritative offices. 
For example, when she explains the 
centrality of practical reason and where we 
set the threshold, for each of the separate 
capabilities, and also constraints on which 
specifications of it we will accept. When 
explaining the value of capability over 
functioning she explains, we set the stage 
and as fellow citizens, present whatever 
arguments we have in favour of a given 
choice, then the choice is up to them.  
The problem would not be resolved 
by a phrase of terminological clarification. 
Rather, the observation is that Nussbaum 
does not develop a proactive account of 
who these ‘reflective equilibrium’ 
discussions should involve. But will the 
suitable ‘we’ emerge passively-for example 
in a rural village of Orissa where the 
Panchayati Raj institutions are active but 
people are passive participants.As 
Nussbaum herself points out, the voices of 
the poor, of women, of the marginalized do 
not automatically sing out; these groups 
may not articulate their views unless 
specific effort is made to involve them. 
This is well known, and efforts ranging 
from participatory poverty reduction 
strategies to national conservation plans to 
constitution-building exercises regularly 
and deliberately engage a wide cross-
section of communities and subgroups in 
hopes that the reluctant general strategies 
will include their views and concerns. So 
Nussbaum’s omission surely is not an 
oversight. Rather, Nussbaum deems the 
‘we’ fixed externally-for example, by 
appointment to the supreme court or by 
elections-or she assesses that proactive 
involvement of poor women in this exercise 
is not essential. Yet, if indeed Nussbaum 
regarded it as very important that persons 
from different cultures agreed on the list 
would it not be equally important that 
persons from lower economic classes took 
equal part in the dialogue-given that their 
perspectives may differ deeply from those 
of the educated and privileged. The point 
that we are trying to make here is that 
Nussbaum’s lack of elaboration of the ‘we’ 
that is invested with the power of 
specifying capabilities and constituting an 
overlapping consensus, leaves her approach 
vulnerable to self-selected elites who might 
legitimize their own views in eloquent 
capability language. At the microeconomic 
level, where the governance structures of 
community organizations are yet more 
flexible, and the probability of local elite 
capture is high, a direct account of who 
should participate is essential.  
Besides these general observations 
against the list of Nussbaum, there are 
specific circumstances where the list 
becomes ineffective. For example, in 
Indian conditions, Nussbaum’s list will be 
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clueless with regard to its applicability. In 
the following address it is argued that 
preparing a list of capability cannot 
provide solutions to the existing system of 
exploitation in India.  
NUSSBAUM’S LIST AND INDIAN 
SCENARIO 
Martha Nussbaum presents a list of 
capabilities which has serious implications 
for India. Nussbaum’s account can be 
criticized looking at the ground realties of 
India. The following are a set of examples 
to demonstrate how Nussbaum fails to 
articulate the Indian scenario 
comprehensively. First of all, Nussbaum’s 
list fails to encapsulate the multiple 
channels of oppression that individuals 
carry on Indian soil. The interconnections 
between caste, class and gender cannot be 
addressed through a list of capabilities as 
Nussbaum suggests. The presence of so 
many caste and sub castes makes it really 
difficult to prepare a list of capabilities. 
Castes matter in Indian society not because 
they carry any values with them. Rather it 
is power which symbolizes one caste in 
one particular place or location. Hence 
caste backed by power becomes crucial to 
understand Indian society. There is little 
scope for universalizing this theory in 
India. We cannot simply say that political 
theory has to take note of the power 
relationships and caste into consideration. 
Rather, in each village or locality we find 
new structures of dominance which is 
essentially different from other places. The 
point that is crucial here is that universality 
cannot be a principle if one intends to 
study these intricate relationships.  
Second, the existence of large scale 
inequality, poverty and illiteracy leaves the 
people vulnerable if they are compelled to 
be part of universal list. Let us say, the list 
is generated through democratic 
deliberation process. But most often, it is 
seen in India that in Gram Sabha or Palli 
Sabha, decisions are taken by a few elites 
in the name of the majority and the entire 
village just says yes to their decisions. 
Again it is because of their power, that 
nobody raises any question in the public 
meetings. Even decisions often processed 
through democratic process, can be 
manufactured and this really affects the 
health of democracy in a country. So in 
this context, it is really surprising that how 
Nussbaum has predicted that a particular 
list will serve the purpose. The mass 
ignorance leaves vast opportunities for the 
agents of state to dictate the terms. That is 
why it is often said that Nussbaum’s ideas 
promote state paternalism. One can 
seriously question the credibility of 
Nussbaum’s list looking at the hierarchical 
power structure of Indian society.  
Third, Nussbaum’s preference for 
some universal principles which would 
guide the functioning of human society 
does not augur well for Indian women’s 
rights activists. There was a time when 
women’s activists were supporting 
Uniform Civil Code. The underlining 
argument was that the common code will 
protect women from domestic violence. 
However, after some time, the activists 
realized how the institution of state can be 
vulnerable to the minorities. So now the 
articulations of demands have changed. 
The faith in the agency of the state to 
protect and enforce individual rights is not 
shared by the majority of democratic rights 
activists in India today ( Menon, 2002). In 
this context, it is important to highlight the 
point made by Nivedita Menon, a 
contemporary women’s rights activist. She 
writes that:  
“She is clear that the inviting 
should not be done by the present 
government, given its religious 
bias, or by the Supreme Court, 
‘given the history of the Shah 
Bano Case’. Rather, the dialogue 
should be promoted by concerned 
NGOs and women’s groups and 
political parties that favor 
pluralism. The point, however, 
that is the enforcing and ensuring 
required by Nussbaum can only be 
carried out by the state. It does not 
seem to me that the Capabilities 
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Approach goes beyond the early 
pro-UCC Indian secular feminist 
position which as we have seen 
has become considerably more 
complex since then”. ( Menon, 
2002) 
Menon tries to underline biasness 
of the Indian state and how a universal law 
cannot address the question of women’s 
exclusion and deprivation. Along with this, 
it can be further argued that even the kind 
of faith that Nussbaum reposes on NGOs 
and other political parties or civil society 
organizations is problematic to me. There 
are many cases where it is seen that local 
movements mobilized on local issues are 
being carried out by NGOs and they in fact 
hijack the grassroots movements to a great 
extent. NGOs are at best can be called as 
mediating institutions between Indian 
Government and International agencies 
working for spread of globalization. So, 
NGOs are funded by international 
agencies. This means that NGOs are not 
accountable to the local people since they 
derive their entire existence from outside. 
It would have been interesting if NGOs 
would have been based on local resources 
and support. Looking at the present 
structure, nobody can be assured of their 
role. For example in Kasipur of Kalahandi 
district, so many NGOs are working 
towards the upliftment of poor tribals. 
Many tribal movements in Kashipur 
district are led by NGOs. Local people 
have no idea of such movements. It can be 
argued that NGOs are actually working as 
a safety valve of the state institutions. 
They neutralize the resisting force of the 
local people. 
Fourth, in Nussbaum’s account of 
capability approach, there is hardly any 
scope for mass movements of resistance. 
On the contrary, her approach is state 
centered and directed towards elite initiated 
policy changes. Mass movements of 
resistance can only be possible only when 
there is space for collective aspirations. 
Movements are always backed by 
collective action. Collective action may be 
violent or peaceful. While movement for 
separate statehood for Jharkhand or 
Telangana is violent, Narmada Bachao 
Andoloan is very Gandhian or peaceful. 
Movements can be defined as collective 
challenges by people with common 
purposes and solidarity in sustained 
interaction with elites, opponents and 
authorities ( Tarrow, 1994). Suppose today 
farmers of U.P decide to protest against the 
central Government’s decision to regulate 
the prices of sugarcane. Very recently a big 
rally was organized to demonstrate their 
opposition to such a move. The decision to 
go on a rally or strike is not an activity of 
individual. Rather it symbolizes the power 
of the collective. Collective action results 
from three possible characteristics-
challenge, uncertainty and solidarity. 
Challenges to authorities threaten costs and 
erupt in dramatic and often unruly ways. 
Their power results, in part, from their 
uncertain outcomes and from the possibility 
that others will join in. Internal solidarity 
supports the challenge and hints at the 
possibility of further disruption. Opponents, 
allies and bystanders respond, not only as a 
function of the sharpness of the challenge 
and uncertainty that it evokes, but from the 
solidarity they see in the protest.( Tarrow, 
1994) It is very clear that when we prepare 
a list of capabilities there is little scope for 
these kinds of things to shape up. In the 
next chapter I have also argued that even in 
Sen’s analysis of capability approach, there 
is hardly any scope for collective action. 
But he has deliberately left it open so that it 
can be filled up according to the new 
requirements. But in Nussbaum’s case, we 
have not found any significant space for 
collective action. The result is that critics 
look at the understanding of Nussbaum as 
very elite oriented or state centric. The 
problem as we can see with Nussbaum is 
that Nussbaum tried to evoke Rawlsian 
‘overlapping consensus’ while speaking 
about a list of capabilities. This is not 
necessary at all. Even though overlapping 
consensus is a much better formulation yet 
the idea still is not very sensitive to the 
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aspirations of the collective. Another thing, 
which comes to our mind that Nussbuam 
tries to work within the broad parameters of 
liberalism. That is why she is obsessed with 
invoking Rawls. What can be argued here 
that even liberal societies with values of 
tolerance and pluralism fail to 
accommodate the principles of Rawls. India 
is a classic example of such a paradigm 
where we have toleration, pluralism yet 
people at many places fail to arrive at a 
consensus. Even there is no unanimity 
among the members of a particular 
religious community. All Hindus may not 
agree to the idea of caste-less marriages. 
All Muslims in India may not be sharing 
the idea that a new Mosque should be built 
around the disputed Ayodhya site. All 
Christians in India may not agree on the 
agenda of religious conversion. So the point 
that we are trying to make here is that 
people cannot be forced with a bunch of 
ideas. Rather, autonomy of the individual 
should be respected to the maximum extent 
possible.  
Fifth, let us the case of family as a 
social institution and Nussbaum’s debate on 
the institution of family in the Indian 
context. Nussbaum attempts to offer a 
critique of prevalent understanding of 
mainstream political approaches that treat 
family as a private sphere existing by nature 
and women as having the natural capacity to 
give love and care. She argues that family is 
also subject to the laws of the state and it is 
state’s responsibility to ensure that, justice is 
done inside family. Indian feminists began 
their journey with the same idea but latter on 
changed the position when they realized that 
the state is not just a neutral or mediating 
institution. Rather they viewed state as 
representing the aspirations of the dominant 
interest groups. The minorities including 
women are excluded from the public space 
and hence Indian feminists increasingly 
began to see state with suspicion. It is in this 
context, we have to understand Nussbaum’s 
stand that the state has the responsibility to 
ensure justice in and outside the family. 
Interestingly, Nussbaum’s views regarding 
dowry is very problematic. Nussbaum 
argues that dowry is illegal and hence it 
should be banned. What is new in this 
equation? The institution of dowry was 
made illegal from the day India got its 
freedom. “The problems have had to do with 
implementation, loopholes in the law, the 
overwhelming pressure of patriarchical 
family ideology-all factors that have to do 
with power and politics, rather than lack of 
reasoned debate.”(Menon, 2002)  In fact 
there is another way to look at this problem. 
Dowry can be justified on the ground that 
women do not have access to their parental 
property after marriage. Hence, they take 
this much of share with their marriage. 
Hence, banning dowry means we have to 
replace it with a new legislation which 
ensures that women have access to resources 
of their parental family. This line of 
argument is entirely Indian. This kind of 
argument is entirely different from what 
Nussbaum believes that the institution of 
dowry can be thrown away by means of 
legislation. She does not intend to go to the 
deeper understanding of Indian society.  
I have argued so far that 
Nussbaum’s idea of preparing a list of 
capabilities is not acceptable at any cost. A 
number of reasons have been outlined as to 
why Nussbaum does not provide a sound 
understanding of Indian context. If we 
accept Nussbaum’s version of capability 
approach then capability approach will 
loose all its attraction. To make things 
worse, in Indian conditions of social 
existence, Nussbaum’s proposition goes in 
a wrong way. Indian diversity, the hidden 
power structure embedded in our society 
and the biasness of the state does not allow 
any social scientist to formulate laws on a 
universal scale. Nussbaum in her attempt 
to universalize the list of capabilities lost 
the moral ground to discuss the Indian 
conditions of diversity. I have given 
examples like problems in the 
implementation of Uniform Civil Code 
and others and how these attempts have 
not yielded desired results. Hence, there is 
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every reason to set aside the proposition given by Nussbaum.  
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